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ABSTRACT
There is much debate about whether the Medicare Prescription Drug Bill –  the greatest expansion
of Medicare benefits since its creation in 1965 – will improve the health of elderly Americans, and
how much it will cost. We model how insurance affects medical care utilization, and subsequently,
health outcomes over time in a dynamic model with correlated errors. Longitudinal individual-level
data from the 1992-1998 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey provide estimates of these effects.
Simulations over five years show that expanding prescription drug coverage would increase drug
expenditures by between 12% and 17%. However, other health care expenditures would only
increase slightly, and the mortality rate would improve.
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In November 2003, Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug Bill in the greatest ex-
pansion of Medicare beneﬁts since its creation in 1965. Despite passage of this landmark
legislation, policymakers and researchers ﬁercely debate two unanswered questions about
the Drug Bill. Will it improve the health of elderly Americans? And what will it cost?
Proponents of the Drug Bill argue that higher outpatient prescription drug utilization will
improve the health status of Medicare beneﬁciaries. Opponents are concerned that prescrip-
tion drugs will have little eﬀect on morbidity and mortality. As for the cost, there is no
consensus regarding the appropriate methodology for cost estimation, so not surprisingly
cost estimates for the new drug beneﬁt program vary considerably. Legislators who opposed
the Drug Bill complained that the original budget projection of $400 billion over ten years
was too high. Then, in February 2004, the White House revised the budget estimate to an
even higher amount of $540 billion.
If proponents are correct that increased prescription drug use will improve health, then
short-run medical care expenditures may fall, particularly if inpatient hospital stays are
avoided. Over time, however, decreased mortality could increase lifetime medical care use.
Investments in health today aﬀect future health status and expenditures (Grossman, 1972).
It is this complicated relationship among medical care use and morbidity and mortality over
time that we explore in our research.
Most health economic studies addressing this policy issue measure the direct eﬀect of
drug insurance on demand for prescription drugs at a point in time. This approach results in
a static cost estimate of the drug beneﬁt. However, projections of long-run costs associated
with drug coverage should reﬂect not only the immediate moral hazard eﬀects (increased de-
mand for drugs), but also short- and long-run changes in morbidity and mortality associated
with changes in both drug and other medical care utilization over time (substitutes or com-
plements). Increased prescription drug use may improve Medicare beneﬁciaries’ health, lower
the disability rate, and decrease mortality (Philipson and Becker, 1998). Improved health
and lower disability rates may in turn lead to reduced hospitalization (a Medicare Part A
expense) and physician services (a Medicare Part B expense) in the short run. Decreased
mortality, however, increases the Medicare-covered population and the potential demand for
1Medicare-covered services in the long run. Those individuals who might otherwise die if un-
able to purchase drug medication may survive with drug coverage. However, these marginal
survivors may have reduced functional status and greater health care needs, complicating
interpretation of the health beneﬁts of drug coverage. Cost projections from studies that
fail to measure the morbidity and mortality consequences of the increased consumption of
drugs as well as the use of other medical care services may over or under estimate the net
ﬁnancial cost of the policy change.
We demonstrate that a fuller understanding of these issues begins with a dynamic be-
havioral analysis that allows the increase in prescription drug utilization induced by more
generous drug coverage to aﬀect subsequent (total) health care expenditures of the elderly
through changes in health status over time. We use data from the longitudinal Medicare
Current Beneﬁciary Survey Data (MCBS) from 1992 to 1998 to jointly estimate a system of
empirical equations representing supplemental insurance coverage, dynamic drug and other
medical care demand, and health production. More speciﬁcally, our ﬁndings quantify the
eﬀect of drug coverage (through Medicaid or employer and private insurance plans) on pre-
scription drug use among Medicare beneﬁciaries, the eﬀect of drug use on functional status
and mortality, and the eﬀect of drug use and health on the subsequent demand for drugs
as well as Medicare Part A (hospitalization) and Part B (physician) services over time. We
simulate the long-run (5 year) eﬀect of increased drug coverage by incorporating behavioral
responses to the policy change year by year. We show that with universal coverage of drugs
prescription drug expenditures in our sample would rise between 12.2 and 17.5% over 5 years,
while inpatient care and physician services use increase only slightly. Much of this increase
due to the induced changes in the composition of health. Long-run survival probabilities
increase, leading to larger proportions of elderly survivors with functional limitations. Our
projections, however, are smaller than those produced by extrapolating static models that
fail to incorporate the dynamic consequences of increased drug use on health outcomes and
other Medicare-covered services use.
This paper ﬁlls a large void in the policy debate about the Medicare prescription drug
beneﬁt, as well as in the health economics literature, by investigating the dynamic nature of
elderly health care behavior and simulating the long-term eﬀect of prescription drug coverage
2on the health outcomes of the elderly and the total cost to Medicare. Dynamic behavioral
models are appropriate when studying complex behavior over time where changes in the
composition of individual characteristics is associated with the behavior of interest. Fortu-
nately, our longitudinal data are suﬃciently rich in both health and expenditure information
to estimate the dynamic empirical model. We use the results from estimation of the model
to answer the policy questions, not only for the sample as a whole, but also for interesting
subpopulations deﬁned, for example, by speciﬁc health outcomes.
2 Background and Literature Review
Even without Medicare prescription drug coverage, elderly Americans (age 65 and older)
spend a large amount on outpatient prescription drugs. In 1995, approximately 85 percent
of the noninstitutionalized elderly had at least one prescription, and the average annual
outpatient prescription drug expenditure was around $600 per person and $22 billion in
total (Poisal et al., 1999). Although the elderly only account for one-eighth of the total
population, their drug expenditures account for one-third of all drug expenditures in the
U.S. (DHHS, 1998; Long, 1994). Elderly persons have greater demand for prescription drugs
because of worse general health, higher disability rates, and a higher prevalence of chronic
diseases (Adams et al., 2001a; Blustein, 2000; Johnson et al., 1997; Lillard et al., 1999; Poisal
et al., 1999; Rogowski et al., 1997; Soumerai and Ross-Degnan, 1999; Stuart and Coulson,
1994).
Despite the high demand, insurance coverage of outpatient prescription drugs is lim-
ited among the elderly. Before 2003, the Medicare program did not cover most outpatient
prescription drugs. However, about 65% of Medicare beneﬁciaries have some drug coverage
from at least one supplemental insurance plan, leaving 35% who must cover the full cost
of outpatient prescription drugs out of pocket. Among those with drug coverage (which
may be from multiple sources), about 44% have employer-provided health insurance (ei-
ther as retirees or active workers), 16% hold privately-purchased individual coverage, 16%
have Medigap insurance, 11% are covered through a Medicare HMO, 17% are on Medicaid,
and 4% have other publicly-provided coverage, including Veteran Assistance or state Phar-
macy Assistance (Poisal et al., 1999). Adverse selection suggests, however, that those who
3purchase additional insurance beyond Medicare are those who expect to have higher than
average expenditures.
Although more than half of the Medicare beneﬁciaries have at least one type of drug
coverage, none of these drug insurance plans are comprehensive. Out-of-pocket payment is
still the largest source of outpatient drug payment for the elderly, and accounts for 50%
of total drug expenditures (Poisel et al., 1999). Several studies show that lack of suﬃcient
insurance coverage is one major reason for under-use of prescription drugs. Steinman and
colleagues (2001) found that, among elderly people age 70 and older in the U.S., chronically
ill patients without drug insurance were more likely to skip doses or avoid using medication
than those with drug insurance. Federman and colleagues (2001) found that, among Medicare
beneﬁciaries with coronary heart disease, those without drug insurance have lower use of
statins, which is a class of expensive and eﬀective cardiovascular drugs, compared with
those who have prescription drug insurance. Poisal and Murray (2001) found that elderly
Medicare beneﬁciaries with drug coverage received 9% more prescriptions on average over
one year, while those without any drug coverage received 2.4% fewer prescriptions. Even
among those Medicare beneﬁciaries who have drug insurance, high copayment rates or other
cost-sharing limitations may restrict the appropriate use of clinically-essential drugs (Reeder
and Nelson, 1985; Soumerai et al., 1987; Soumerai and Ross-Degnan, 1990; Soumerai et al.,
1991; Soumerai et al., 1994).
Most studies of the potential costs of a Medicare prescription drug beneﬁt are cross-
sectional and provide a point-in-time correlation between drug coverage and drug utilization.
These studies suggest that insurance increases prescription drug use, and the more generous
plans have the strongest positive eﬀects (Adams et al., 2001b; Blustein, 2000; Lillard et al.,
1999; Long, 1994; Poisal et al., 1999; Rogowski et al., 1997). Other cross-sectional studies
conducted at the state or community level draw similar conclusions (Fillenbaum et al., 1993;
Stuart and Coulson, 1993; Stuart and Grana, 1995).
To better understand the eﬀects of increased drug coverage among the elderly, it is
necessary to consider both the eﬀect of insurance on drug use, as well as the eﬀect of drug
use on other health care costs and health outcomes. With regard to the eﬀect of drug use
on non-drug health expenditures, Soumerai and colleagues (1991) found that a reduction
4in use of outpatient drugs due to a prescription cap in New Hampshire led to increased
hospital and nursing home admission rates among elderly beneﬁciaries over one year. For
mentally ill patients, the increase in the cost of non-drug medical services even exceeded
the savings in reduced prescription drug use (Soumerai et al., 1994). A study conducted in
Canada revealed that greater consumer cost-sharing for prescription drugs led to a reduction
in consumption of essential drugs, and higher rates of adverse health events and emergency
room visits among elderly persons (Tamblyn et al., 2001). These studies, however, do not
consider explicitly the eﬀect of altered drug use on patient mortality or morbidity.
Turning to the eﬀect of drug use on health outcomes, Gowrisankaran and Town (2004)
analyzed county-level mortality rates over time and found that greater enrollment in Medi-
care managed care insurance plans without a drug beneﬁt was associated with higher mor-
tality but found no association between mortality and Medicare managed care plans with
drug coverage. Federman et al. (2001) and Lichtenberg (2003) found that greater use of
clinically-essential drugs or newer drugs may decrease the population mortality rate. None
of these studies, however, investigate morbidity and functional status among the survivors
and their subsequent health care expenditures. Some researchers argue that chronic diseases
are the main reason for functional disability and therefore suggest that the development and
use of new drugs could decrease disability rates (Cutler, 2001; Ferrucci and Guralnik, 1997).
Measurement of the eﬀect of drug use on health outcomes (both mortality and mor-
bidity) over time is necessary for predicting the net cost of a Medicare drug beneﬁt. For
example, studies that fail to consider the possible reduction in disability rates due to drug
use may overstate the net cost of the drug beneﬁt given the positive correlation between
disability and inpatient care expenditures among the elderly (Stearns et al., 2003). If the
elderly live longer but healthier lives, then the total medical care cost at the population
level may not necessarily increase. Alternatively, studies that fail to consider how drug use
aﬀects morbidity and mortality may understate the long-term net costs of a Medicare drug
beneﬁt. A lower mortality rate and greater longevity will increase the number of Medicare
beneﬁciaries and lead to greater demand for all Medicare-covered health care services. Ad-
ditionally, the distribution of health among survivors changes: increased survival may imply
a larger proportion of disabled elderly. There is a large void in the existing literature, and
5a striking omission of longitudinal analyses of individual behavior, that could explain the
complicated causal relationship between drug utilization, changes in health status, and sub-
sequent expenditures on other medical care services among the elderly population (Adams
et al., 2001a). This paper seeks to ﬁll the void.
3 Model of Elderly Health Dynamics
3.1 Empirical Framework
To understand the impact of insurance on elderly medical care consumption decisions, we
model annual individual utilization and health transitions over time. Our empirical model
allows outpatient prescription drug use to be related to other medical care use both directly
(as a substitute or complement) and indirectly (as it aﬀects health over time). Our model has
four key features: 1) observed supplemental prescription drug coverage decisions depend on
unobserved individual characteristics that also inﬂuence the demand for prescription drugs
(endogenous insurance coverage), 2) current consumption of diﬀerent types of medical care
may be correlated (joint estimation of diﬀerent medical care services), 3) current medical
care consumption inﬂuences future health which also determines future consumption (joint
estimation of medical care inputs and health outcomes), and 4) past medical care consump-
tion inﬂuences current consumption partially through pathways other than health (direct
eﬀects of lagged behavior). We discuss each of these components of the model in turn.
Supplementation of Medicare coverage with prescription drug insurance is a choice. We
assume that all elderly persons (age 65 and older) are eligible for Medicare (and virtually all
elect both Part A and Part B Medicare coverage in our data). We categorize supplemental
health insurance coverage as either Medicaid (which covers prescription drugs), any private
insurance with a drug beneﬁt, or any private insurance without a drug beneﬁt. We allow
the observed supplemental health insurance coverage, It, of an individual to be inﬂuenced
by unobservable individual characteristics (e.g., health history, preferences for care) that
also inﬂuence medical care decisions and health transitions. Assumed exogeneity of drug
coverage would bias estimates of its eﬀect on drug consumption if such adverse selection
occurs. Correct estimates of this eﬀect are crucial for evaluating the costs and beneﬁts of
prescription drug coverage.
6While this study focuses on how drug coverage aﬀects prescription drug use, we can-
not ignore the correlated use of other medical services such as hospital and physician care.
These diﬀerent types of medical care may be complements to or substitutes for prescrip-
tion drug use. That is, a hospital stay may require physician care follow-ups exhibiting
positive contemporaneous correlation in (annual) use. Alternatively, prescription drug use
may prevent, delay, or substitute for costly hospitalization reﬂecting negative contempo-
raneous correlation. Hence, we jointly model the per-year demand for prescription drugs,
Dt; hospitalization (Medicare Part A), At; and physician services (Medicare Part B), Bt.
Our empirical treatment of possible correlation among contemporaneous unobservables is
discussed later.
In each year, Ht represents health status at the beginning of the annual observation
period t. In the empirical model health status is deﬁned by functional limitations. Given
her observed health status, an individual optimally chooses a level of outpatient prescrip-
tion drug utilization, Dt, and utilization of other forms of medical care, At and Bt. Her
objective is to maximize the value of current period health-state dependent utility (of med-
ical care consumption and consumption of other goods) subject to her budget constraint
and out-of-pocket costs plus the discounted present value of future utility given uncertainty
about health transitions. Current health and medical care inputs determine health in the
subsequent period through a health production function. Hence, one empirical objective is
to quantify the eﬀect of endogenous and interrelated health care choices on future health.
This Grossman-like dynamic health production function is essential for linking current con-
sumption behavior with future health (and indirectly, future medical care utilization) and
thus appropriately predicting net costs of expanded drug coverage.
Finally, our model allows for a direct relationship between medical care consumption
in successive years in addition to the indirect relationship exhibited through annual health
transitions. That is, previous health care use may directly aﬀect the marginal utility of
current medical care alternatives independent of the eﬀect of prior medical care use on
health outcomes. For example, some Medicare beneﬁciaries develop stable and trustworthy
relationships with their outpatient care physicians over time. An individual with more
physician contact (or a regular source of care), all else equal, may be more likely to ﬁll
7prescriptions and use other forms of medical care in the future because of the relationship that
has been established between patient and provider. Hence, we allow past medical care use to
inﬂuence current medical care use. It is important, however, to appropriately model serial
correlation in individual unobservables that might lead to an apparent statistical correlation
in use across time. A major concern is accurately modeling unobserved health since the
health measures available in the data may not fully capture the eﬀects of past medical
care utilization through the health production function. Failing to account for unobserved
heterogeneity would incorrectly attribute signiﬁcance to lagged consumption behavior.
It remains to test these implications empirically.
3.2 Empirical Speciﬁcation
We begin by specifying equations for the dynamic medical care utilization and health out-
comes of individuals over time. The observed heterogeneity in our set of equations includes
endogenous health status, Ht; supplemental insurance coverage, It; and past medical care
consumption (Dt−1,At−1,Bt−1). We also indicate any hospitalization in the fourth quarter
of the previous year by Qt−1 because medical care demand in adjacent years might be more
highly correlated immediately following a hospitalization (i.e., in the next quarter). Addition-
ally, exogenous permanent and time-varying demographic information, Xt, and exogenous
health shocks, St, inﬂuence observed outcomes. We hold discussion of the unobserved het-
erogeneity that leads to correlation in unobservables across equations to the next subsection
after the basic model has been described.
The distributions of prescription drugs and hospital expenditures are highly skewed,
with some people having zero expenditures. Therefore, current expenditures of these two
types of medical care are modelled in two parts. The ﬁrst part employs a logit model to
estimate the probability of any expenditures (et > 0). That is,




where et = αYt + u
e
t
= αe0 + αe1Ht + αe2It + αe3Dt−1 + αe4At−1 + αe5Bt−1
+λe [αe61(At−1 > 0) + αe7(1(At−1 > 0) · Qt−1)]
8+αe8Xt + αe9St + u
e
t,
(e = (D,A); λ = 1 if e = D; λ = 0 if e = A) .
The second part uses a linear model to estimate the log of expenditures conditional on pos-
itive expenditures. Because almost every Medicare beneﬁciary uses some physician services
each year, only one equation representing the log of total Part B expenditures is estimated.
Thus,
ln(et|et > 0) = δe0 + δe1Ht + δe2It + δe3Dt−1 + δe4At−1 + δe5Bt−1
λe [δe61(At−1 > 0) + δe7(1(At−1 > 0) · Qt−1)]
+δe8Xt + δe9St + u
e
t, (2)
(e = B; e = (A,D) if et > 0; λ = 1 if e = D; λ = 0 if e 6= D) .
The index function 1(·) equals one when the endogenous previous behavior in parenthesis
is true and is zero otherwise. The vectors of estimated parameters on observable covariates
are α and δ.
Health transitions are determined by a health production function. The speciﬁcation
is dynamic because of its dependence on the endogenous lagged values of health and medical
care expenditures. Health is measured as a 6-category outcome representing worsening
health, with death as the extreme negative health outcome. Using a multinomial logit
model, the health production function is









+γh8(Dt · Ht) + γh9(D
2
t · Ht)
+γh10(Dt · Xt) + γh11(D
2
t · Xt)
+γh12(At · Ht) + γh13(Bt · Ht)
+γh14(At · Xt) + γh15(Bt · Xt) .
The vector of covariate parameters, γ, is estimated jointly with the parameters in equations 1
and 2.
9For reasons explained in the data section, we do not model changes in health insurance
over time (e.g., switching, adding, or dropping coverage). As such, the period t = 1 polydi-
chotomous supplemental insurance choices are modeled in reduced form as multinomial logit
outcomes where





and ηiY1 = ηi0 + ηi1X1 + ηi2Z1
The variables Z1 aﬀect the insurance choice only and are uncorrelated with X1. Five ad-
ditional reduced-form equations explain the initial health status and expenditures that are
observed in the ﬁrst period of the data. These initial observations cannot be explained using
speciﬁcations 1, 2, or 3 because lagged values of important variables are not observed in this
ﬁrst period. All of these initial observations, however, may be correlated with subsequent
observations through unobserved heterogeneity that we discuss next.
3.3 Unobserved Individual Heterogeneity
Each of the main equations representing medical care demand and health production (Equa-
tions 1, 2, and 3) along with reduced form equations for initially observed insurance coverage,
health status, and expenditures (6 additional equations), has an associated error term that
captures diﬀerences in behavior that cannot be explained by observed diﬀerences across in-
dividuals or over time. These unobserved individual characteristics likely inﬂuence many or
all of the behaviors we model. To allow for this correlation, we estimate the set of equations
jointly rather than separately. Our empirical framework incorporates two speciﬁc types of
unobserved heterogeneity. One type is permanent individual heterogeneity, such as unob-
served attitudes toward medical treatment or quality of health care providers. For example,
a patient who prefers outpatient care to inpatient care is more likely to seek drug treatment
than a patient who better tolerates inpatient care. Similarly, he may choose supplemental
insurance with better prescription drug coverage.
The other type of unobserved heterogeneity is time-varying heterogeneity. The time
unit of analysis in this study is a calendar year. Within this time frame the health status
10of Medicare beneﬁciaries may change signiﬁcantly. Although the health production function
helps to explain health transitions over a year, other unobserved factors also inﬂuence changes
in health status. An example of an unobserved characteristic that varies over time for
a particular individual is the unobserved rate of natural deterioration of health. Although
medical care consumption may help people maintain good health, the health status of elderly
people deteriorates naturally because of aging, and more importantly, at diﬀerent rates for
diﬀerent people. It is diﬃcult to obtain empirically the theoretical result that medical care
utilization improves health outcomes because greater utilization is typically observed by
individuals in poorer health. Hence it is important to control for time-varying unobserved
individual heterogeneity. Similarly, unobserved time-varying shocks to one’s health might
explain simultaneous correlation between diﬀerent types of medical care demand.
Let ue
t denote the unobserved error term associated with outcome e (e = A,B,D,H, or I)
at time t (t = 1,2,...,T). In order to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity, we
decompose the error term of each equation into three components. The ﬁrst part, µ, captures
permanent, or time-independent, unobserved individual heterogeneity; the second part, νt,
controls for time-varying unobserved individual heterogeneity; and the third part, εe
t, is a
serially uncorrelated error term for equation e. Let ρe be the factor loading on µ for equation
e and ωe be the factor loading on νt. The error decomposition is
u
e
t = ρeµ + ωeνt + ε
e
t (5)
where ρe, µ, ωe, and νt are estimated parameters in the empirical model. Note that ρH and
ρI are vectors of parameters for each estimated outcome Ht = h and I1 = i. One could think
of ρµ as an individual ﬁxed eﬀect and ωνt as a time-varying eﬀect. The notation chosen,
however, is speciﬁc to the estimation strategy (described below) used to model and estimate
these two types of heterogeneity.
We treat the unobserved heterogeneity (µ and νt) as discrete random eﬀects and inte-
grate them out of the model (see Heckman and Singer (1983) and Mroz (1999) for analyses
comparing this procedure and others). This method of allowing correlation in unobservables
across multiple equations without imposing a distributional form has been used in a wide
variety of empirical applications including health (Goldman, 1995; Cutler, 1995; Blau and
11Gilleskie, 2001; Mays and Norton, 2000; Mello, Stearns, and Norton, 2002), welfare par-
ticipation (Hoynes, 1996), child care (Blau and Hagy, 1998; Hu, 1999), disability insurance
(Kreider and Riphahn, 2000), and program evaluation (Angeles et al., 1998). Diﬀerent from
the ﬁxed eﬀect or the general random eﬀect approach, the discrete random eﬀect approach
assumes error terms in the correlated equations have discrete distributions of several mass
points of support µm and an accompanying probability weight θm , m = 1,...,M, where M
is determined empirically. Analogously, the points of support of the time-varying heterogene-
ity, νkt, and the probability weights, ψk , k = 1,...,K, are estimated (with the appropriate
normalizations for identiﬁcation). This approach models the common heterogeneity that af-
fects health expenditures, health outcomes, insurance coverage, and initial conditions. The
approach is more eﬃcient than a ﬁxed eﬀect approach that requires estimation of N −1 ad-
ditional parameters, where N is the total number of individuals in the sample. Additionally,
there is no distributional assumption imposed on the error terms µ and νt and, hence, the
method minimizes possible estimation bias from the stronger assumption of a speciﬁc error
term distribution, such as joint normality, which is commonly assumed in models of joint



















ψk Pr(Dnt = 0|µm,νkt)
1(Dnt=0) · [(1 − Pr(Dnt = 0)|µm,νkt) · φD(·|µm,νkt)]
1(Dnt>0)
· Pr(Ant = 0|µm,νkt)











Density functions for expenditures are denoted by φe(·),e = D,A,and B. The likelihood
function includes the probability of supplemental health insurance coverage in period t = 1
as the only estimated initial condition. We actually estimate ﬁve additional reduced-form
equations in the initial period to capture health and the probability of any Medicare Part
A expenditures and any prescription drug expenditures, as well as the log expenditures on
drugs (conditional on any) and the log expenditures on Medicare Part B services. These
initial condition equations are necessary because equations in the subsequent period depend
12on their endogenous lagged values. These additional equations are estimated jointly with the
other equations and correlated through the unobserved permanent individual heterogeneity.
3.4 Identiﬁcation
Identiﬁcation in this system of equations is straightforward following the arguments of Bhar-
gava and Sargan (1983) and Arellano and Bond (1991). Estimation of dynamic equations
with panel data requires exogeneity of some of the explanatory variables conditional on the
unobserved individual heterogeneity. Thus, all lagged values of exogenous variables serve
to identify the system. Similarly, conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity (µ and νt),
lagged values of the endogenous variables also aid identiﬁcation assuming there is no serial
correlation in the remaining errors. Additionally, we include some exogenous variables in the
reduced-form speciﬁcation of the initial conditions that do not independently aﬀect the per-
period equations. These include height, which serves to measure health during childhood,
and many detailed self-reported health conditions. Height is jointly signiﬁcant in the initial
condition equations, and is found to be insigniﬁcant when included in the main equations.
Our speciﬁcation of the permanent and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity also serves
to identify the system, allowing all lagged i.i.d. errors to independently inﬂuence current
behavior (e.g., through inclusion of lagged health in the expenditure equations).
4 Description of Data
The Medicare Current Beneﬁciary Survey (MCBS) is well suited for estimating our dynamic
model. The MCBS is a longitudinal survey conducted by the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services. Information in the MCBS is provided in two major parts—the survey
ﬁles and the events ﬁles. Each respondent of the sample was surveyed three times a year and
follow for multiple years. At the ﬁrst interview, the respondents answered questions about
their demographics, insurance and health status, including their functional status and chronic
conditions. After the ﬁrst interview, the respondents were asked to keep the receipts of all
their medical bills subsequent to the ﬁrst interview. The bills were then collected to keep
track of use and cost information. At the end of each year, usually between September and
December, respondents re-answered questions about their health status to record changes
13in their health. The events ﬁles include the date, charge and payment information of each
inpatient, outpatient, medical provider, nursing home, home health and hospice event since
the ﬁrst interview and is based on claims data. The charge and payment information of each
prescription or reﬁll are also recorded, but the exact date of each prescription or reﬁll is not
available.
Our study uses the MCBS ﬁles from 1992 to 1998. As part of a longitudinal survey, the
respondents were followed for up to ﬁve years. This longitudinal feature of MCBS makes it
possible to estimate the eﬀect of drug utilization in one year on subsequent health outcomes
and medical care utilization in the next year. However, not all of the respondents in the
sample were followed for the same number of years. Some of them died or dropped out
during the survey period. Additionally, new individuals were brought into the survey each
year allowing the sample size to be relatively similar across time.
The unit of analysis in our model is a person year. In order to focus on elderly Medicare
beneﬁciaries, we ﬁrst exclude respondents under age 65. After this initial exclusion, 25,208
unique individuals remain in the sample. Because expenditures on outpatient prescription
drugs are not available from the MCBS for people who lived in long-term care facilities, we
exclude 3,740 people who lived in a nursing home at any time during the survey period. Of
these, almost 60% were continuously institutionalized throughout the observation period,
and hence, do not contribute to our analysis. We avoid complicating the model further by
ignoring the 6% of the elderly sample who enter a nursing home during our sample period
rather than modeling this type of attrition from the sample. Because few individuals switch,
add, or drop supplemental insurance coverage, we exclude those observed to change insurance
coverage over time (7% of respondents during our sample period). This allows us to avoid
modeling the rare event of changing supplemental insurance coverage, yet we still model
the endogeneity of the initially-observed supplemental insurance coverage. Future work will
explore incorporating these two sources of endogenous selection.
Table 1 shows the sample distribution of the data by number of years followed and by
calendar year. Among the 19,980 unique people with data available for our purposes, 14,439
were surveyed for more than one year. Because observations in an individual’s ﬁrst year
of the survey deﬁne his or her initial conditions, only individuals who are followed for at
14least two years are used in estimation. The ﬁnal sample of 14,439 people contributes 42,174
person-year observations used to estimate the per-period expenditures and health outcomes.
The average annual outpatient prescription drug expenditure (conditional on any) was
$714 over the 1992-1998 period. We adjust all expenditures in the sample to 1998 dollars
using the Consumer Price Index of Medical Services. Although the observed probability of
prescription drug use is nearly constant with age, expenditures, if any, gradually fall (see
Figure 1). Triangles represent the observed statistics from the actual sample; we discuss
simulated observations indicated by circles later. This simple graph illustrates the complex
relationship between medical care use and age. One might expect expenditures to rise with
age as health is likely to be deteriorating. However, those individuals who survive to older
ages may be healthier reﬂecting a negative relationship between medical care expenditures
and age among survivors. That is, those individuals who live longer are likely to be in better
health (relative to the health of those who died previously), and hence may spend less at
older ages on prescription drugs.
Figure 2 illustrates similar patterns of Part A inpatient expenditures (conditional on
any) with age (mean: $11,267). However, the probability of hospitalization increases dra-
matically with age from around 12% at age 65 to over 30% at ages above 90. The lower
average hospital expenses as individuals age suggest that the stays of older patients may be
shorter than those of younger patients. This may be due to higher death rates or reﬂect the
less aggressive treatment of those who are hospitalized at older ages. Figure 3 shows annual
Part B physican expenditures by age. Nearly all Medicare-covered individuals have some
Part B expenses within the year. On average, these expenditures are $1,588.
Measurement of health status should reﬂect true health as accurately and broadly as
possible. Rather than use subjective self-reported health, we select the somewhat more
objective measures of functional status. (We estimated the model with both measures of
health and found very few diﬀerences in the results.) In the MCBS, a survey of functional
status is conducted between September and December in every calendar year. Half of the
sample respondents report some functional limitation at some point during the survey period.
About 15 percent express diﬃculties in Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL) only,
with more than 35 percent reporting diﬃculties in at least one Activity of Daily Living
15(ADL). The six categorical values of health are 1) no functional impairment; 2) any IADLs
only; 3) 1 or 2 ADLs; 4) 3 or 4 ADLs; 5) 5 or 6 ADLs; and 6) death. Table 2 details one-year
health transitions of the elderly over the sample period. This table highlights the extent of
movement among health categories in general; obviously the transition rates diﬀer by age
and other characteristics. About 40% of the elderly remain in a given health state from one
year to the next. However, transitions to poorer health are common. Death is more probable
with increases in functional limitations with nearly 20% of those with 5-6 ADLs dying in a
given year. Interestingly, the incidence of health improvement is signiﬁcant. Almost 20% of
the sample experiences improved health from one year to another.
Table 3 summarizes additional variables used to explain expenditures and health tran-
sitions. These include both endogenous variables (which are jointly modeled with the main
expenditure and health equations) and exogenous variables. Note that most of the explana-
tory variables vary across time. The sources of major supplemental insurance for Medicare
beneﬁciaries are the Medicare managed care option, Medicaid, employer-provided insurance,
and individually-purchased insurance. In order to measure the eﬀect of third-party coverage
of drugs, we grouped employer-provided, privately-purchased, and managed care insurance
by whether or not the plan oﬀered outpatient prescription drug coverage. Thus, in the em-
pirical model, supplemental insurance includes three dummy variables indicating whether
the Medicare beneﬁciary has Medicaid, any private insurance with a drug beneﬁt, or any
private insurance without a drug beneﬁt. (The supplemental health insurance decision, es-
timated jointly as an initial condition, is modeled as a 4-choice multinomial logit equation
with no supplement to Medicare as the base outcome.) About 13% of the Medicare-covered
sample respondents were also Medicaid beneﬁciaries, and 52% of the sample respondents
were enrolled in at least one type of private insurance with a drug beneﬁt. Altogether, al-
most two-thirds of the sample respondents had some type of outpatient prescription drug
coverage.
Five diseases or injuries account for most health shocks among the elderly population.
These include: cancer, heart disease, cerebrovascular diseases, respiratory system diseases,
and hip and other body part fractures. In the empirical model, the health shocks, St, are
measured by whether respondents were diagnosed in period t with any one of these ﬁve life
16threatening diseases or injuries. On average over the seven-year span, diagnoses of cancer,
heart disease, and respiratory system diseases (including pneumonia with heart/lung co-
morbidities, COPD, and inﬂuenza) were at rates of 9, 22, and 22 percent a year, respectively.
Cerebrovascular disease and hip and other body part fractures were less frequent with these
health shocks occurring at rates of 4 and 1 percent per year on average. The survey also
includes self-reported chronic conditions present in any period. More than half of the sample
respondents have or have had hypertension, 25 percent have had a heart attack, 34 percent
have been diagnosed with cancer and 17 percent have diabetes. Case and Paxson (2004) ﬁnd
that diﬀerences in morbidity and mortality across genders can be explained by diﬀerences in
the distribution of chronic conditions.
As a representative sample of aging Medicare beneﬁciaries, the average age of the
sample is 75.2 years (see Table 3). Sixty percent of the sample are female. One-half of the
respondents are married, and 40 percent are widowed. Minority populations account for 12
percent of the entire sample, and 27 percent of the sample live in a rural area.
5 Results
5.1 Estimation Results
The interpretation of results is diﬃcult in this dynamic system of demand equations and
health production with its feed-forward structure. First we discuss the signs and signiﬁcance
of the main explanatory variables in each equation, which qualitatively describes the short-
run eﬀects. In section 5.2 we discuss simulation results to illustrate the inﬂuence of particular
variables in the long run, taking into account changes in health status and mortality.
In our preferred model that controls for endogeneity (i.e., the jointly estimated set
of correlated equations henceforth labeled with unobserved heterogeneity), drug coverage
has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on whether a person purchases any prescription drugs (see Table
4a, second column), but does aﬀect expenditures for those who purchase any (see Table
4a, fourth column). The signs of the coeﬃcients are generally in the expected direction,
and depend on whether someone is disabled or has a chronic disease. For those who are
disabled, Medicaid and private drug coverage increase prescription drug expenditures in the
short term. For those with chronic diseases, private insurance increases prescription drug
17expenditures. The only coeﬃcient that has an unexpected sign is that of Medicaid’s impact
on conditional drug expenditures, which is negative. This implies that conditional on having
at least one prescription, elderly persons on Medicaid spend less on prescription drugs than
elderly with no coverage other than Medicare. This result may in part reﬂect that while
Medicaid improves access to drugs among the elderly it does not necessarily encourage them
to spend more on drugs.
Drug coverage has little inﬂuence on the probability or (log) level of hospital expendi-
tures (see Table 4b, second and fourth columns). This is to be expected because all elderly
persons have inpatient hospital care covered by Medicare. Prescription drug coverage should
not have a direct eﬀect on inpatient hospital care, other than as a substitute form of care.
However drug coverage does aﬀect expenditures on outpatient physician services (see Table
4c, second column). Those on Medicaid and with private insurance without drug coverage
have higher physician expenditures in the short run.
To view the bias eliminated with our preferred approach, it is necessary to compare the
coeﬃcient estimates from our jointly estimated system of equations with those produced by
estimating the equations independently (i.e., separate estimation of uncorrelated equations
henceforth labeled without unobserved heterogeneity). The alternative approach treats previ-
ous behavior, health, and insurance as exogenous and hence does not account for correlation
in individual unobservables across time or between contemporaneous endogenous variables.
In models that do not control for unobserved heterogeneity, drug coverage appears to have
a signiﬁcant positive impact on the use of prescription drugs (see Table 4a, ﬁrst column).
Insurance also appears to play a greater role in inﬂuencing hospital and physician expendi-
tures (see Tables 4b and 4c). In particular, the coeﬃcients on drug coverage are considerably
larger when the endogeneity of insurance is not modeled. These ﬁndings are consistent with
unobservable individual characteristics associated with adverse selection that generate an
upward-biased correlation between health insurance coverage and utilization. When this
adverse selection is modeled, the positive marginal eﬀect of insurance coverage on expen-
ditures is smaller. Hence, the ﬁrst feature of our preferred model (endogenous insurance
coverage) improves our understanding of the eﬀect of coverage on utilization. Controlling
for this unobserved heterogeneity reveals little change in the positive (in most cases) eﬀect
18of drug coverage on prescription drug expenditure and inpatient expenditure, conditional on
any expenditures.
In modeling the permanent and time-varying individual unobserved heterogeneity that
is likely to inﬂuence insurance, expenditures, and health, we found three mass points to
be suﬃcient to capture the distribution of permanent heterogeneity, and two mass points
for time-varying heterogeneity. (Estimation with more mass points on either factor did not
improve the ﬁt of the model.) The estimated loadings are positive and jointly signiﬁcant,
suggesting that individuals with unobserved characteristics to the right of the distribution
are more likely to use that health service and to spend more on it (see last two rows of
Tables 4a through 4c). Therefore, expenditures are positively correlated both within a
given period and across time. The results suggest that these outcomes are endogenous and
correlated. Hence, feature two of our preferred model (joint estimation of diﬀerent medical
care services) is warranted; the model without heterogeneity does not allow for correlation
in unobservables across contemporaneous outcomes. It should also be noted that the factor
loadings on the unobserved heterogeneity in the insurance equation (Appendix Table A1) are
also positive, suggesting that those in worse unobserved health, for example, are more likely
to have supplemental coverage and have higher medical care expenditures. (Coeﬃcients in
the other initial condition equations are presented in Appendix Tables A2 and A3.)
We turn now to estimation results from the health production function. The im-
portance of modeling this equation jointly with the expenditure equations is to capture
correlation in the error terms associated with health outcomes and endogenous medical care
inputs that aﬀect health. Such correlation is conﬁrmed if marginal eﬀects of the endogenous
inputs diﬀer when heterogeneity is modeled and when it is not. While we observe only small
diﬀerences, if any, in the coeﬃcients explaining the relatively better health outcomes (in re-
lationship to no health limitations), we ﬁnd sizable diﬀerences in the estimates for the worst
health outcomes. For example, the eﬀects of medical care use on the probability of dying
relative to having no functional limitations are much larger when unobserved heterogeneity is
modeled. In particular, prescription drug expenditures have a non-linear negative marginal
eﬀect (note squared term) on the probability of dying, and that this eﬀect is greater when we
account for unobserved correlation between drug use and health outcomes. Notice also that
19while inpatient and physician services expenditures appear to reduce health (i.e., increase
the probability of being in the worse health state), this eﬀect is moderated for individuals
with greater functional limitations. The sign of the heterogeneity factor loadings is consis-
tent with the notion of unobserved bad health. The third feature of our preferred model
(joint estimation of medical care inputs and health outcomes) appropriately relates health
and medical care use over time.
Finally, we investigate the impact of lagged medical care use on current expenditures.
Serial correlation in use as well as expenditures requires that permanent unobserved hetero-
geneity be modeled if we do not want to incorrectly assume that previous behavior causes
current behavior. Diﬀerences in point estimates between a model with and without this het-
erogeneity demonstrate the importance of modeling the endogeneity of past use. In Table
4a, for example, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of Part B expenditure in the previous year on the
probability of any drug use in the current year switches signs from being positive and signiﬁ-
cant in the model that does not control for unobserved individual diﬀerences to negative and
signiﬁcant in the model with unobserved heterogeneity. Interestingly, Part B expenditures
and hospitalization in the previous year both reduce drug expenditures in the current year.
Drug use across years is positively related even after purging the estimates of bias associ-
ated with serial correlation. These estimates suggest that previous use has a direct eﬀect
on current use independent of its indirect eﬀect through changes in health. In Table 4b,
we again ﬁnd that modeling the unobserved correlation between Part B expenditures and
inpatient use changes the sign, with previous physician service use reducing probabilities of
current hospitalization. Previous drug use does not aﬀect hospitalization probabilities and
expenditures when heterogeneity is modeled. The eﬀects of expenditures in the previous
year on Part B expenditures in the current year fall dramatically when we account for unob-
served heterogeneity (Table 4c). Most importantly, we ﬁnd that prescription drug use in the
previous period reduces current physician service expenditures suggesting that drugs may
be substitutes for physician care. We have attempted to adequately capture health with
both the observed measures of health and the unobserved heterogeneity. If our eﬀorts have
been unsuccessful then lagged expenditures may, in part, reﬂect true health. We maintain,
however, that our results conﬁrm importance of the fourth feature of our preferred model
20(direct eﬀects of lagged behavior). These ﬁndings will have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the long-run
cost projections associated with a Medicare drug beneﬁt. In section 5.2 we quantify these
eﬀects.
We demonstrate the ﬁt of our preferred model by comparing observed outcomes of the
sample with model predictions using estimated model parameters and observed explanatory
variables. The top panel of Table 6 summarizes each outcome by year, as observed in the
sample. The lower panel reports predictions from our model using the observed data as re-
gressors. To demonstrate the ﬁt of the model we use the observed values of covariates as they
appear in the original data when generating predictions; we do not update behavior based on
past predictions. We describe in Table 6 how well the model matches the unconditional dis-
tributions of expenditures and health. Comparisons of observed and predicted prescription
drug use and expenditures, hospitalization rates and expenditures, and physician services
expenditures by age are depicted in Figures 1, 2, and 3 (indicated by circles). The model
ﬁts these outcomes well, bearing in mind that the sample size gets relatively small at ages
above 90.
5.2 Simulation of Drug Coverage
The eﬀect of drug coverage on health expenditures and health in this nonlinear dynamic
model is best shown with simulations. The simulations quantify the long-run eﬀect of drug
coverage by incorporating the dynamic eﬀects of behavior on future choices and health
transitions. To answer the policy question of how expansion of prescription drug coverage to
all elderly Medicare beneﬁciaries would aﬀect health care expenditures, we choose a ﬁve-year
period. This is long enough to demonstrate the importance of a dynamic model but not so
long as to simulate beyond our data. We simulate expenditures and health transitions of
our sample over ﬁve years under three diﬀerent drug coverage scenarios: no supplemental
insurance beyond Medicare (i.e., no drug coverage), coverage by Medicaid, and coverage by
private insurance with a drug beneﬁt. We show results from models that do and do not
control for unobserved heterogeneity.
The details of the simulation are straightforward. In each period we use the estimated
model to predict demand for prescription drugs and Medicare Part A and B services for the
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health production function to update end-of-period health. This simulated health outcome
is then transferred to the next period. Conditional on the updated health and previous
(simulated) expenditures, expenditures are again simulated. This process can be repeated
for any number of years. We use the simulated values of all endogenous right hand side
variables but retain the observed (in the original data) values of exogenous variables (e.g.,
age, marital status, rural residency, etc.). Because we treat health shocks as exogenous, we
simulate these events according to the observed distribution of health shocks in each year.
Some people die each year; these observations are not replaced. We generate 400 simulations
for each individual allowing for one draw from the permanent unobserved heterogeneity
distribution for the ﬁve-year period and draws from the time-varying distribution every
year. Predicted probabilities of any expenditures and health outcomes are mapped to the
unit interval and a uniform random variable determines the outcome. Normal random errors
are added to predicted log expenditures to determine expenditure outcomes. Simulations are
repeated using the same random numbers but providing either a Medicaid insurance beneﬁt
or a private drug insurance beneﬁt that inﬂuences drug consumption directly, and compared
to simulations with no supplemental coverage.
Drug coverage increases prescription drug expenditures in our sample by 12.2 to 17.5
percent over a ﬁve-year period, according to our preferred model (see top half of Table 7).
These comparisons are averaged over the entire sample, and simulate a policy change of going
from no prescription drug coverage to either a typical Medicaid beneﬁt or a typical private
beneﬁt. The model without heterogeneity suggests a larger average range of the increase from
10.6 to 20.3 percent (see bottom half of Table 7). In contrast to the substantial increase in
drug expenditures, Part A and Part B expenditures increase only slightly over ﬁve years. On
average, each individual spends 0.9 percent more on Part A expenditures and 2.5 percent
more on Part B expenditures over ﬁve years if a Medicaid-like drug beneﬁt is provided. The
increasing rates for Part A and Part B expenditures are slightly higher if a drug beneﬁt
as generous as the private beneﬁt is provided. The model without heterogeneity predicts
that increases in these non-drug expenditures would be almost twice as large. Decreases
in death rates associated with drug coverage are larger in the model with heterogeneity
22compared to the model without heterogeneity. The ﬁve-year survival rate increases from by
1.57 percentage points if a Medicaid-like drug beneﬁt is provided. The increase in survival
rate and disability rates among survivors are both higher if a drug beneﬁt similar to private
insurance is provided.
In an eﬀort to further understand the eﬀects of prescription drug coverage on health
outcomes and health care expenditures, we categorize the health transitions of the simulated
sample by changes in health outcomes over the ﬁve year period. That is, the health of
survivors has either improved, remained the same, or deteriorated, or individuals may have
died. The top panel of Table 8 details the composition of the sample when no drug bene-
ﬁt is available, and when beneﬁts similar to Medicaid or private supplemental insurance are
available. This decomposition reveals that a drug beneﬁt reduces the ﬁve-year mortality rate
by about 2 percentage points, but that the survivors are more likely to experience declines
in their health rather than maintaining or improving their health. While this might be ex-
pected, it gives us an understanding of the associated increase in medical care expenditures.
The bottom panel of Table 8 describes the medical care utilization within each category of
health transition with diﬀerent types of drug beneﬁt. The largest percentage increases in
prescription drug expenditures occurs among the survivors. Individuals who die before the
end of the ﬁve-year period spent more on drugs when covered, but increased their consump-
tion by at least one-third less than those who survived. This is particularly striking because
survival is longer among those who died when some type of drug coverage is provided. The
information on Part A and Part B expenditures reveals that individuals who die spend more
on hospitalization and physician services despite contributing fewer years to the ﬁve-year
total calculation. The behavior when drug coverage is introduced suggests that much of the
increase in consumption occurs among those individuals who experience declines in health
yet survive.
In Table 9 we glean more information on the expenditures and health outcomes of
survivors. Here we deﬁne survivors as sole survivors or marginal survivors. Sole survivors
are those individuals who live regardless of the drug beneﬁt structure. Marginal survivors
would have died if no drug beneﬁt were available. Put diﬀerently, marginal survivors survive
when either a Medicaid or private drug beneﬁt is available. As expected, sole survivors are
23healthier in year one than marginal survivors. They are younger, more likely to be female,
and have fewer functional limitations, with more than half of the sample (57%) having no
functional limitations. Although diﬀerences in age and health at baseline among these two
groups explain some of the diﬀerences in health outcomes, we see that supplemental drug
coverage results in very diﬀerent medical care responses across the two groups. The sole
survivors increase their drug consumption a moderate amount, but exhibit very little change
in other expenditures. The marginal survivors, however, spend over 50% more on drugs, and
over 20% more on hospital and physician service expenditures.
Instead of updating the data each period to reﬂect the per-period simulated choices, we
could use the model to predict behavior each year and retain the original values of explana-
tory variables in the following year. This calculation, which we refer to as the immediate
eﬀect, does not allow a policy change (such as the introduction of prescription drug beneﬁts)
to have dynamic eﬀects. The calculated eﬀects reﬂect static changes in behavior only. This
simulation is consistent with results reported from static models that do not capture the ef-
fects of altered behavior on future outcomes. As with the ﬁve-year simulations, we compute
the immediate eﬀect both with and without unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 10 shows the immediate eﬀect of drug coverage on the behavior of the elderly.
The marginal eﬀect of adding a Medicaid drug beneﬁt is quite diﬀerent when controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity. The model without heterogeneity predicts a 7.5 percent increase
in total drug expenditures if a Medicaid-like drug beneﬁt is provided, while the prediction
from our preferred model is lower (5.5 percent). The two models produce similar results
when universal provision of a drug beneﬁt resembles private coverage of prescription drugs.
As expected, drug coverage has no inﬂuence on other medical care utilization during the
same year when calculating the immediate eﬀect. This is why it is beneﬁcial to evaluate
the long-run eﬀect of this policy change. Drug coverage also inﬂuences end-of-period health.
Most noticeably, the death probability is approximately 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points lower
when drug coverage is provided universally than when it is not available. Admittedly, drug
use appears to be positively related with worse health outcomes, conditional on survival.
But this too, is expected. Prescription drug use might prevent death, but, in doing so, the
proportion (of survivors) in worse health increases.
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The simulation results suggest that a prescription drug beneﬁt will increase the demand
for prescription drugs (on average between 12.2 and 17.5 percent over 5 years), but that
this increase will not be as large as that predicted by static models or those that do not
account for the endogeneity of past decisions. Drug coverage will decrease the mortality
rate of the elderly population, but will reﬂect increases in the average disability rate of
the elderly population as more sick people are living longer. Over the long term, there is
no obvious increase in demand for hospital care either among the survivors or among the
entire population (including both survivors and decedents) in total. But we may expect a
slight increase in demand for outpatient physician services. This eﬀect, however, is smaller
than would be predicted by using results from a static model and forecasting (which will
not account for endogenous changes in health and past utilization), or failing to account for
unobserved individual characteristics. Given the increase in survival rates and the increased
use of other Medicare-covered services, Medicare’s drug beneﬁt will likely increase total
Medicare costs. However, this additional burden reﬂects increased longevity (decreased
mortality). For the healthier people, prescription drugs may help them maintain or improve
their health conditions slightly, but for those who are in worse health and dying fast, a
prescription drug beneﬁt may help these people more signiﬁcantly by reducing the mortality
rate and extending longevity.
Our study contributes to the policy debate regarding the Medicare prescription drug
beneﬁt in several ways. First, our study goes beyond looking at the eﬀect of drug policy
on the demand for drugs only, and investigates the possible dynamic eﬀects of this policy
change on Medicare beneﬁciaries’ health and other Medicare-covered services expenditures.
Second, our study provides evidence that health care behavior of the elderly is correlated over
time, and that the signiﬁcance of this relationship is dependent on unobserved permanent
heterogeneity as well as time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. Third, our study produces
both short-term and long-run predictions of the eﬀects of a Medicare prescription drug beneﬁt
that illustrate the dynamic eﬀects of this policy change on total Medicare costs as well as
the health status of Medicare beneﬁciaries in our sample. Our results indicate that without
consideration of the dynamic eﬀects of the new Medicare Drug Bill, the real cost of this
25policy change to Medicare could be even higher than current estimates due to the increase
in survival and the increased demand for other Medicare-covered services. With a higher
percentage of older people surviving with ADLs, health policy makers should consider all
consequences of this policy change. For example, the drug beneﬁt may lead, indirectly, to a
higher demand for long-term care or increased reliance on state Medicaid programs. Further
research into these additional indirect eﬀects is warranted.
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Figure 3: Actual and Simulated Physician Service Expenditures, by Age
34Table 1: Empirical Distribution of Participation in MCBS, 1992-1998
Years Followed # %
of inds of sample
At Least 2 Years 14,439 100
At Least 3 Years 9,999 69
At Least 4 Years 2,570 18
More than 4 Years 727 5
Exactly 2 Years 4,440 31
Exactly 3 Years 7,429 51
Exactly 4 Years 1,843 13








Number of unique individuals 14,439
Number of person-year observations 42,174
35Table 2: Observed One-Year Health Status Transitions
Health Statust+1
% No IADLs 1-2 3-4 5-6 Die
I/ADLs only ADLs ADLs ADLs
Health Statust
No I/ADLs 0.50 0.79 0.10 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.02
IADLs only 0.15 0.29 0.38 0.23 0.04 0.01 0.05
1-2 ADLs 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.45 0.11 0.04 0.07
3-4 ADLs 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.30 0.35 0.17 0.10
5-6 ADLs 0.03 0.01 0.20 0.08 0.19 0.50 0.20
Dead 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
36Table 3: Description of Additional Explanatory Variables
Variable Mean Std Dev
Supplemental Insurance (omitted: none)
Medicaid 0.13 0.32
Private Insurance with Drug Beneﬁts 0.52 0.50
Private Insurance without Drug Beneﬁts 0.27 0.44
Health Shocks (new diagnosis in t)
Cancer (ICD-9 140-209) 0.09 0.23
Heart Diseases (ICD-9 390-430) 0.22 0.41
Cerebrovascular Diseases (ICD-9 430-439) 0.04 0.19
Respiratory System Diseases (ICD-9 480-496) 0.22 0.41




Emphysema, Asthma, COPD 0.14 0.35
Hardening of Arteries 0.15 0.36
Heart Attack 0.25 0.43
Hypertension 0.57 0.50
Other Heart Diseases 0.31 0.46
Stroke 0.12 0.32
Age (range: 65-104 years) 75.26 7.17
Education (range: 0-18 years) 10.13 4.22
Male (omitted: female) 0.41 0.49




Other Non-White 0.02 0.15
Marital Status (omitted: married)
Widowed 0.38 0.49
Divorced or Separated 0.10 0.30
Note: Other explanatory variables include lagged medical care use,
health status, year indicators, and polynomials and interactions.
37Table 4a: Selected Parameter Estimates Explaining Prescription Drug Expenditures
Any Expenditure ln(Expenditure | Any)
Without Unobs’d With Unobs’d Without Unobs’d With Unobs’d
Heterogeneity Heterogeneity Heterogeneity Heterogeneity
Supplemental Insurance .
Medicaid 0.288 * 0.181 –0.058 –0.081 *
(0.149) (0.158) (0.042) (0.042)
Private Insurance with Drug Coverage 0.210 ** 0.154 0.074 ** 0.072 **
(0.099) (0.105) (0.029) (0.029)
Private Insurance without Drug Coverage 0.163 * –0.015 –0.035 –0.057 **
(0.090) (0.095) (0.024) (0.025)
Medicaid × Disabled 0.125 0.098 0.095 ** 0.099 **
(0.167) (0.176) (0.037) (0.038)
Medicaid × Chronic Disease –0.054 –0.080 0.116 ** 0.116 **
(0.187) (0.194) (0.038) (0.038)
Private Drug Beneﬁt × Disabled 0.234 ** 0.222 ** 0.108 ** 0.105 **
(0.094) (0.097) (0.018) (0.018)
Private Drug Beneﬁt × Chronic Disease –0.002 –0.021 –0.023 –0.027
(0.119) (0.115) (0.026) (0.026)
Lagged Health Care Utilization
Prescription Drug Expenditure in the Previous Year 0.671 ** 0.684 ** 0.483 ** 0.484 **
(0.013) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003)
Hospitalized in Previous Year –0.174 –0.001 –0.010 0.018
(0.117) (0.121) (0.019) (0.018)
Hospitalized in 4th Quarter of Previous Year –0.892 ** –1.005 ** –0.032 –0.041
(0.162) (0.167) (0.029) (0.029)
Physician Service Expenditure in the Previous Year 0.047 ** –0.059 ** 0.011 ** –0.006 **
(0.010) (0.013) (0.002) (0.003)
Unobserved Heterogeneity .
Factor loading on permanent heterogeneity, ρ — 0.205 ** — 0.010
— (0.096) — (0.024)
Factor loading on time-varying heterogeneity, ω — 1.505 ** — 0.349 **
— (0.065) — (0.019)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates joint signiﬁcance at the 5% level; * 10% level.
Disabled indicator deﬁned as any IADL or ADL (50% of sample). Chronic Disease indicator deﬁned as any chronic disease
reported on or before current period (33% of sample). Additional explanatory variables include those in Table 3.
See bottom of Table 4c for description of heterogeneity distributions.
3
8Table 4b: Selected Parameter Estimates Explaining Inpatient Hospital Expenditures (Part A)
Any Expenditure ln(Expenditure | Any)
Without Unobs’d With Unobs’d Without Unobs’d With Unobs’d
Heterogeneity Heterogeneity Heterogeneity Heterogeneity
Supplemental Insurance
Medicaid 0.089 0.043 –0.013 –0.009
(0.083) (0.088) (0.065) (0.063)
Private Insurance with Drug Coverage 0.174 ** 0.158 ** –0.063 –0.023
(0.074) (0.079) (0.060) (0.058)
Private Insurance without Drug Coverage 0.175 ** 0.118 0.020 0.026
(0.077) (0.081) (0.061) (0.060)
Lagged Health Care Utilization
Prescription Drug Expenditure in the Previous Year 0.023 ** 0.012 –0.015 * –0.009
(0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
Hospitalized in the Previous Year 0.660 ** 0.733 ** 0.050 0.085 **
(0.046) (0.051) (0.033) (0.033)
Physician Service Expenditure in the Previous Year 0.004 –0.046 ** 0.050 ** 0.026 **
(0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Factor loading on permanent heterogeneity, ρ — 0.065 — 0.021
— (0.078) — (0.062)
Factor loading on time-varying heterogeneity, ω — 1.390 ** — 0.949 **
— (0.067) — (0.105)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates joint signiﬁcance at the 5% level; * 10% level. Additional
explanatory variables include those in Table 3. See bottom of Table 4c for description of heterogeneity distributions.
3
9Table 4c: Selected Parameter Estimates Explaining Physician Service Expenditures (Part B)
ln(Expenditure)
Without Unobs’d With Unobs’d
Heterogeneity Heterogeneity
Supplemental Insurance
Medicaid 0.490 ** 0.164 **
(0.054) (0.038)
Private Insurance with Drug Coverage 0.164 ** 0.006
(0.046) (0.033)
Private Insurance without Drug Coverage 0.475 ** 0.080 **
(0.048) (0.035)
Lagged Health Care Utilization
Prescription Drug Expenditure in the Previous Year 0.107 ** –0.014 **
(0.006) (0.005)
Hospitalized in the Previous Year –0.396 ** 0.019
(0.034) (0.022)
Physician Service Expenditure in the Previous Year 0.449 ** 0.174 **
(0.005) (0.004)
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Factor loading on permanent heterogeneity, ρ — 0.181 **
— (0.034)
Factor loading on time-varying heterogeneity, ω — 4.965 **
— (0.024)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates joint signiﬁcance at the 5% level; * 10% level.
Additional explanatory variables include those in Table 3. The discrete mass points of the permanent
heterogeneity occur at 0.0, 0.69, and 1.0 with estimated probabilities of 0.16, 0.27, and 0.55, respectively.
The distribution of time-varying heterogeneity has mass at 0.0 and 1.0 with estimated weights
of 0.16 and 0.83.
4
0Table 5: Selected Parameter Estimates Explaining End-of-Period Health Status Transitions
(relative to the outcome no functional status limitations)
Outcome: Die Without Unobs’d With Unobs’d
Heterogeneity Heterogeneity
Health Care Utilization during period
Prescription Drug Expenditure 0.088 0.092
(0.061) (0.067)
Square of Prescription Drug Expenditure –0.064 ** –0.067 **
(0.008) (0.009)
Inpatient Care Expenditure 0.361 ** 0.356 **
(0.021) (0.023)
Physician Service Expenditure 0.042 0.136 **
(0.035) (0.067)
Health Status at beginning of period
IADLs only 1.727 ** 1.687 **
(0.289) (0.297)
1-2 ADLs 2.369 ** 2.299 **
(0.260) (0.267)
3-4 ADLs 5.601 ** 5.606 **
(0.617) (0.576)
5-6 ADLs 6.442 ** 6.265 **
(0.881) (0.673)
Interaction of Health Status and Utilization
IADLs only × Prescription Drug Expenditure 0.036 0.039
(0.049) (0.052)
1-2 ADLs × Prescription Drug Expenditure 0.042 0.053
(0.045) (0.047)
3-4 ADLs × Prescription Drug Expenditure 0.114 0.125
(0.096) (0.094)
5-6 ADLs × Prescription Drug Expenditure 0.123 0.134
(0.152) (0.144)
IADLs only × Inpatient Expenditure 0.007 0.002
(0.027) (0.044)
1-2 ADLs × Inpatient Expenditure 0.044 * 0.044
(0.025) (0.026)
3-4 ADLs × Inpatient Expenditure 0.007 0.006
(0.050) (0.049)
5-6 ADLs × Inpatient Expenditure –0.173 * –0.179 **
(0.082) (0.083)
IADLs only × Physician Service Expenditure –0.036 –0.031
(0.046) (0.049)
1-2 ADLs × Physician Service Expenditure –0.084 ** –0.084 **
(0.042) (0.043)
3-4 ADLs × Physician Service Expenditure –0.296 ** –0.308 **
(0.089) (0.093)
5-6 ADLs × Physician Service Expenditure –0.054 –0.039
(0.131) (0.125)
Factor loading on permanent heterogeneity, ρ — 0.454 **
— (0.148)
Factor loading on time-varying heterogeneity, ω — –0.913 **
— (0.180)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates joint signiﬁcance at the 5% level; * 10% level.
Additional explanatory variables include individual demographic information.
41Table 5: — Continued
Outcome: 5-6 ADLs Without Unobs’d With Unobs’d
Heterogeneity Heterogeneity
Health Care Utilization during period
Prescription Drug Expenditure –0.243 ** –0.203 *
(0.117) (0.117)
Square of Prescription Drug Expenditure 0.049 ** 0.046 **
(0.009) (0.009)
Inpatient Care Expenditure 0.169 ** 0.154 **
(0.034) (0.033)
Physician Service Expenditure 0.180 ** 0.341 **
(0.082) (0.081)
Health Status at beginning of period
IADLs only 1.232 1.516
(1.004) (0.852)
1-2 ADLs 4.224 ** 4.205 **
(0.692) (0.620
3-4 ADLs 7.783 ** 7.849 **
(0.871) (0.778)
5-6 ADLs 9.286 ** 9.221 **
(1.062) (0.815)
Interaction of Health Status and Utilization
IADLs only × Prescription Drug Expenditure –0.207 * –0.212 *
(0.116) (0.113)
1-2 ADLs × Prescription Drug Expenditure –0.101 –0.102
(0.098) (0.097)
3-4 ADLs × Prescription Drug Expenditure 0.037 0.039
(0.126) (0.123)
5-6 ADLs × Prescription Drug Expenditure –0.029 –0.033
(0.171) (0.159)
IADLs only × Inpatient Expenditure –0.022 –0.016
(0.047) (0.045)
1-2 ADLs × Inpatient Expenditure –0.056 –0.055
(0.037) (0.035)
3-4 ADLs × Inpatient Expenditure –0.146 ** –0.144 **
(0.052) (0.049)
5-6 ADLs × Inpatient Expenditure –0.259 ** –0.260 **
(0.084) (0.085)
IADLs only × Physician Service Expenditure 0.292 ** 0.253 **
(0.133) (0.119)
1-2 ADLs × Physician Service Expenditure –0.012 –0.009
(0.087) (0.082)
3-4 ADLs × Physician Service Expenditure –0.165 –0.179 *
(0.111) (0.107)
5-6 ADLs × Physician Service Expenditure 0.041 0.052
(0.147) (0.146)
Factor loading on permanent heterogeneity, ρ — –0.199
— (0.156)
Factor loading on time-varying heterogeneity, ω — –1.288 **
— (0.260)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates joint signiﬁcance at the 5% level; * 10% level.
Additional explanatory variables include individual demographic information.
42Table 5: — Continued
Outcome: 3-4 ADLs Without Unobs’d With Unobs’d
Heterogeneity Heterogeneity
Health Care Utilization during period
Prescription Drug Expenditure –0.186 ** –0.149
(0.084) (0.087)
Square of Prescription Drug Expenditure 0.053 ** 0.051 **
(0.007) (0.008)
Inpatient Care Expenditure 0.136 ** 0.124 **
(0.024) (0.024)
Physician Service Expenditure 0.156 ** 0.265 **
(0.058) (0.061)
Health Status at beginning of period
IADLs only 3.067 ** 3.049 **
(0.569) (0.057)
1-2 ADLs 5.134 ** 5.105 **
(0.472) (0.467)
3-4 ADLs 8.894 ** 8.935 **
(0.710) (0.652)
5-6 ADLs 8.190 ** 8.178 **
(0.989) (0.087)
Interaction of Health Status and Utilization
IADLs only × Prescription Drug Expenditure –0.047 –0.052
(0.081) (0.082)
1-2 ADLs × Prescription Drug Expenditure –0.062 –0.067
(0.067) (0.067)
3-4 ADLs × Prescription Drug Expenditure –0.047 –0.047
(0.103) (0.100)
5-6 ADLs × Prescription Drug Expenditure 0.001 –0.007 **
(0.163) (0.153)
IADLs only × Inpatient Expenditure –0.037 –0.037
(0.031) (0.031)
1-2 ADLs × Inpatient Expenditure –0.082 ** –0.081 **
(0.025) (0.025)
3-4 ADLs × Inpatient Expenditure –0.118 ** –0.115 **
(0.045) (0.042)
5-6 ADLs × Inpatient Expenditure –0.237 ** –0.237 **
(0.083) (0.083)
IADLs only × Physician Service Expenditure –0.081 –0.074
(0.071) (0.070)
1-2 ADLs × Physician Service Expenditure –0.132 ** –0.125 **
(0.060) (0.060)
3-4 ADLs × Physician Service Expenditure –0.292 ** –0.301 **
(0.093) (0.095)
5-6 ADLs × Physician Service Expenditure –0.112 –0.103
(0.139) (0.142)
Factor loading on permanent heterogeneity, ρ — –0.341 **
— (0.113)
Factor loading on time-varying heterogeneity, ω — –0.755 **
— (0.207)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates joint signiﬁcance at the 5% level; * 10% level.
Additional explanatory variables include individual demographic information.
43Table 5: — Continued
Outcome: 1-2 ADLs Without Unobs’d With Unobs’d
Heterogeneity Heterogeneity
Health Care Utilization during period
Prescription Drug Expenditure –0.057 –0.047
(0.037) (0.038)
Square of Prescription Drug Expenditure 0.026 ** 0.025 **
(0.004) (0.005)
Inpatient Care Expenditure 0.066 ** 0.062 **
(0.012) (0.013)
Physician Service Expenditure 0.053 ** 0.092 **
(0.017) (0.022)
Health Status at beginning of period
IADLs only 2.193 ** 2.193 **
(0.185) (0.188)
1-2 ADLs 3.410 ** 3.418 **
(0.162) (0.166)
3-4 ADLs 5.516 ** 5.588 **
(0.573) (0.530)
5-6 ADLs 4.567 ** 4.607 **
(0.926) (0.706)
Interaction of Health Status and Utilization
IADLs only × Prescription Drug Expenditure –0.019 –0.019
(0.030) (0.031)
1-2 ADLs × Prescription Drug Expenditure –0.034 –0.035
(0.026) (0.027)
3-4 ADLs × Prescription Drug Expenditure –0.022 –0.020
(0.086) (0.083)
5-6 ADLs × Prescription Drug Expenditure 0.010 0.007
(0.159) (0.148)
IADLs only × Inpatient Expenditure –0.013 –0.013
(0.017) (0.017)
1-2 ADLs × Inpatient Expenditure –0.035 ** –0.035 **
(0.015) ( 0.015)
3-4 ADLs × Inpatient Expenditure –0.049 –0.049
(0.041) (0.039)
5-6 ADLs × Inpatient Expenditure –0.104 –0.104
(0.083) (0.084)
IADLs only × Physician Service Expenditure –0.057 ** –0.057 **
(0.024) (0.017)
1-2 ADLs × Physician Service Expenditure –0.052 ** –0.053 **
(0.022) (0.015)
3-4 ADLs × Physician Service Expenditure –0.199 ** –0.214 **
(0.077) (0.079)
5-6 ADLs × Physician Service Expenditure –0.094 –0.099
(0.132) (0.125)
Factor loading on permanent heterogeneity, ρ — –0.121 *
— (0.065)
Factor loading on time-varying heterogeneity, ω — –0.230 **
— (0.110)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates joint signiﬁcance at the 5% level; * 10% level.
Additional explanatory variables include individual demographic information.
44Table 5: — Continued
Outcome: IADLs only Without Unobs’d With Unobs’d
Heterogeneity Heterogeneity
Health Care Utilization during period
Prescription Drug Expenditure –0.074 ** –0.066 *
(0.035) (0.036)
Square of Prescription Drug Expenditure 0.024 ** 0.023 **
(0.004) (0.004)
Inpatient Care Expenditure 0.065 ** 0.060 **
(0.012) (0.013)
Physician Service Expenditure 0.016 0.057 **
(0.016) (0.020)
Health Status at beginning of period
IADLs only 2.430 ** 2.426 **
(0.152) (0.156)
1-2 ADLs 1.694 ** 1.689 **
(0.187) (0.189)
3-4 ADLs 3.461 ** 3.532 **
(0.659) (0.614)
5-6 ADLs 2.424 ** 2.411 **
(1.157) (0.937)
Interaction of Health Status and Utilization
IADLs only × Prescription Drug Expenditure –0.021 –0.020 **
(0.026) (0.026)
1-2 ADLs × Prescription Drug Expenditure 0.030 0.032
(0.031) (0.031)
3-4 ADLs × Prescription Drug Expenditure 0.046 0.050
(0.102) (0.098)
5-6 ADLs × Prescription Drug Expenditure 0.052 0.052
(0.194) ( 0.183)
IADLs only × Inpatient Expenditure –0.009 –0.009
(0.160) (0.016)
1-2 ADLs × Inpatient Expenditure –0.014 –0.013
(0.016) (0.017)
3-4 ADLs × Inpatient Expenditure 0.009 0.012
(0.047) (0.043)
5-6 ADLs × Inpatient Expenditure –0.171 –0.172 *
(0.102) (0.101)
IADLs only × Physician Service Expenditure –0.039 * –0.039 *
(0.021) (0.022)
1-2 ADLs × Physician Service Expenditure –0.039 -0.040
(0.025) (0.025)
3-4 ADLs × Physician Service Expenditure –0.229 ** –0.245 **
(0.086) (0.089)
5-6 ADLs × Physician Service Expenditure –0.012 –0.011
(0.155) (0.154)
Factor loading on permanent heterogeneity, ρ — –0.006
— (0.070)
Factor loading on time-varying heterogeneity, ω — –0.302 **
— (0.121)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates joint signiﬁcance at the 5% level; * 10% level.
Additional explanatory variables include individual demographic information.
45Table 6: Comparisons of Actual Observations and Model Predictions, by year
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Average
Observations from MCBS
Probability of Prescription Drug Use 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.89
Drug Expenditure, If Any 564 608 655 702 756 826 943 714
Probability of Hospitalization 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.19
Hospital Expenditure, If Any 11,480 11,844 11,856 11,311 10,982 10,836 10,415 11,246
Physician Service Expenditure 1,613 1,641 1,651 1,335 1,612 1,601 1,655 1,586
Probability of Death 0 0.034 0.042 0.038 0.043 0.036 0.050 0.035
# of observations 5,574 6,379 6,544 5,965 5,910 6,314 4,191 40,877
Predictions from Preferred Model
Probability of Prescription Drug Use 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Drug Expenditure, If Any 799 752 773 789 795 803 795 786
Probability of Hospitalization 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.18
Hospital Expenditure, If Any — 11,671 12,166 12,215 12,119 12,088 12,186 12,074
Physician Care Expenditure 1,430 1,533 1,877 1,917 1,939 1,897 2,007 1,800
Probability of Death 0 0.047 0.038 0.028 0.035 0.027 0.038 0.030
# of observations 5,574 6,379 6,544 5,965 5,910 6,314 4,191 40,877
Note: Observations in this table include only those observed and simulated to be alive in a particular year.
By construction, everyone in 1992 survives because individuals contribute a minimum of two
years of data to estimation.
4
6Table 7: Five-year Simulation of Health Care Expenditures and Health Outcomes
No Observed % Medicaid % Private %
Beneﬁt Beneﬁt 4∗ Beneﬁt 4∗ Beneﬁt 4∗
With Unobs’d Heterogeneity
Health Care Expenditures
Prescription Drug Expenditure 2,886 3,211 11.3 3,238 12.2 3,392 17.5
Hospital Expenditure 8,771 8,828 0.6 8,853 0.9 8,888 1.4
Physician Service Expenditure 8,827 9,021 2.2 9,055 2.5 9,140 3.5
Health Outcomes
Survival 79.81 80.80 0.99 81.27 1.57 81.92 2.11
No I/ADLs 54.6 53.4 –1.2 53.2 –1.4 52.6 –2.0
IADLs Only 15.3 15.5 0.2 15.5 0.2 15.6 0.3
1-2 ADLs 18.6 19.1 0.5 19.2 0.6 19.4 0.8
3-4 ADLs 6.3 6.6 0.3 6.7 0.4 6.8 0.5
5-6 ADLs 5.0 5.3 0.3 5.4 0.4 5.5 0.5
Without Unobs’d Heterogeneity
Health Care Expenditures
Prescription Drug Expenditure 3,308 3,679 11.22 3,657 10.6 3,879 20.3
Hospital Expenditure 9,141 9,251 1.20 9,258 1.3 9,294 1.7
Physician Service Expenditure 9,736 10,145 4.20 10,174 4.5 10,398 6.8
Health Outcomes
Survival 79.70 80.76 1.06 80.59 0.89 80.99 1.29
No I/ADLs 54.3 53.1 –1.2 52.9 –1.4 52.3 –2.0
IADLs Only 15.3 15.5 0.2 15.5 0.2 15.5 0.2
1-2 ADLs 18.8 19.1 0.3 19.3 0.5 19.5 0.7
3-4 ADLs 6.5 6.8 0.3 6.8 0.3 7.0 0.5
5-6 ADLs 5.2 5.5 0.3 5.5 0.3 5.6 0.3
Note: * % 4 refers to percentage change when the outcome is in levels (expenditures)
and percentage point change when the outcome is a percent (health).
We report changes in behaviors from simulations of no drug coverage to the observed
beneﬁt structure (combinations of no supplemental coverage, Medicaid coverage, and
private coverage of drugs), to a Medicaid-like beneﬁt, and to a private insurance beneﬁt,
respectively.
47Table 8: Total Expenditures by ﬁve-year Health Status Transition
No Medicaid % Private %
Beneﬁt Beneﬁt 4∗ Beneﬁt 4∗
Health Status Outcomes in year 5
(compared to year 1)
Improved 18.53 18.56 0.03 18.56 0.03
Unchanged 39.01 39.21 0.20 39.25 0.24
Deteriorated 22.26 23.59 1.33 24.11 1.85
Died in or before year 5 20.19 18.73 –1.57 18.08 –2.11
Medical Care Expenditures
Prescription Drugs
Improved 3,388 3,750 11.8 3,908 15.3
Unchanged 2,807 3,139 10.6 3,282 16.9
Deteriorated 3,598 4,028 11.9 4,223 17.6
Died in or before year 5 1,796 1,943 8.2 2,001 11.4
Part A Expenditures
Improved 6,980 7,125 2.0 7,165 2.6
Unchanged 6,650 6,757 1.6 6,780 1.9
Deteriorated 9,625 9,819 2.0 9,921 3.0
Died in or before year 5 13,605 13,817 1.5 13,869 1.9
Part B Expenditures
Improved 8,555 8,758 2.6 8,820 3.0
Unchanged 7,379 7,574 2.3 7,654 3.7
Deteriorated 10,480 10,792 2.9 10,937 4.3
Died in or before year 5 10,048 10,254 2.0 10,298 2.4
Note: * % 4 refers to percentage change when the outcome is in levels (expenditures)
and percentage point change when the outcome is a percent (health).
48Table 9: Total (ﬁve-year) Expenditures and 5th Year Health Outcomes
(sole survivors vs. marginal survivors)
First No Medicaid % No Private %




No Disability 0.57 0.54 0.54 0 0.54 0.53 –0.1
IADL only 0.17 0.15 0.15 0 0.15 0.16 0.1
1-2 ADLs 0.19 0.19 0.19 0 0.19 0.19 0
3-4 ADLs 0.05 0.06 0.06 0 0.06 0.06 0
5-6 ADLs 0.02 0.05 0.05 0 0.05 0.05 0
Drug Expenditures — 3,480 3,680 5.7 3,477 4,028 15.8
Part A Expenditures — 7,404 7,411 0.1 7,434 7,447 0.2




No Disability 0.42 0 0.36 0.36 0 0.32 0.32
IADL only 0.17 0 0.15 0.15 0 0.15 0.15
1-2 ADLs 0.25 0 0.23 0.23 0 0.25 0.25
3-4 ADLs 0.10 0 0.11 0.11 0 0.13 0.13
5-6 ADLs 0.07 0 0.14 0.14 0 0.15 0.15
Die 0 1 0 –1 1 0 –1
Drug Expenditures — 1,802 2,845 57.9 1,956 3,310 69.2
Part A Expenditures — 14,770 17,431 18.1 14,052 16,649 18.5
Part B Expenditures — 9,961 14,453 45.1 9,992 12,724 27.3
Note: * % 4 refers to percentage change when the outcome is in levels (expenditures)
and percentage point change when the outcome is a percent (health).
Two diﬀerent ‘no beneﬁt’ columns are included because the composition
of survivors is diﬀerent across insurance simulations.
49Table 10: Immediate Eﬀect of Drug Beneﬁt
No Observed % Medicaid % Private %
Beneﬁt Beneﬁt 4∗ Beneﬁt 4∗ Beneﬁt 4∗
With Unobs’d Heterogeneity
Health Care Expenditures
Prescription Drug Expenditure 635 686 8.0 670 5.5 717 12.9
Hospital Expenditure 2,305 2,305 0 2,305 0 2,306 0
Physician Service Expenditure 1,610 1,610 0 1,610 0 1,610 0
Health Outcomes
Survival 95.3 95.5 0.2 95.5 0.2 95.6 0.3
No I/ADLs 52.8 52.5 –0.3 50.7 –0.1 52.4 –0.3
IADLs Only 16.1 16.1 0 16.1 0 16.1 0
1-2 ADLs 19.9 20.0 0.1 20.0 0.1 20.1 0.2
3-4 ADLs 6.7 6.8 0.1 6.8 0.1 6.9 0.2
5-6 ADLs 4.4 4.4 0 4.4 0 4.4 0
Without Unobs’d Heterogeneity
Health Care Expenditures
Prescription Drug Expenditure 700 761 8.7 753 7.5 793 12.5
Hospital Expenditure 2,365 2,367 0 2,367 0 2,367 0
Physician Service Expenditure 1,540 1,540 0 1,540 0 1,540 0
Health Outcomes
Survival 95.2 95.3 0.1 95.4 0.1 95.5 0.3
No I/ADLs 52.8 52.5 –0.3 52.5 –0.3 52.4 –0.4
IADLs Only 16.0 16.2 0.2 16.1 0.1 16.1 0.1
1-2 ADLs 20.0 20.2 0.2 20.1 0.1 20.2 0.2
3-4 ADLs 6.7 6.8 0.1 6.8 0.1 6.9 0.2
5-6 ADLs 4.3 4.3 0 4.3 0 4.4 0.1
Note: * % 4 refers to percentage change when the outcome is in levels (expenditures)
and percentage point change when the outcome is a percent (health).
We report changes in behaviors from simulations of no drug coverage to the observed
beneﬁt structure (combinations of no supplemental coverage, Medicaid coverage, and
private coverage of drugs), to a Medicaid-like beneﬁt, and to a private insurance beneﬁt,
respectively.
50Table A1: Parameter Estimates Explaining Initial Supplemental Insurance
Other Insurance Other Insurance
Medicaid With Drug Beneﬁt Without Drug Beneﬁt
Age –0.07 0.25** 0.39**
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Age Squared 0.04 –0.17** –0.23**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Male –0.72** –0.56** –0.76**
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Race: Black 0.12 –1.20** –1.80**
(0.11) (0.09) (0.11)
Race: Hispanic 1.31** –0.71** –1.03**
(0.27) (0.30) (0.35)
Race: Other Nonwhite 1.04** –0.68** –0.71**
(0.21) (0.21) (0.23)
Years of Education –0.11** 0.10** 0.06**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Rural Resident –0.26** –0.84** –0.14*
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Income –0.74** 0.41** 0.30**
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Height (in inches) –0.05** 0.01 –0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Previously Had Cancer 0.01 0.16** 0.23**
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Previously Had Diabetes 0.25** 0.09 0.08
(0.11) (0.09) (0.09)
Previously Had Heart Attack 0.20* 0.08 –0.04
(0.10) (0.08) (0.10)
Previously Had Hardening Artery –0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.12) (0.10) (0.11)
Previously Had Hypertension 0.28** 0.14** 0.05
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Previously Had Other Heart Diseases 0.26** 0.17** 0.13
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Previously Had Lung Disease 0.40** –0.07 –0.15
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Previously Had Stroke 0.20* –0.19* –0.17
(0.12) (0.10) (0.11)
Factor loading on permanent heterogeneity, ρ 1.16** 0.55** 1.21**
(0.10) (0.07) (0.08)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates joint signiﬁcance at the 5% level; * 10% level.
The omitted outcome is no supplemental insurance of any kind.
51Table A2: Parameter Estimates Explaining Initial Health Care Expenditures
Prescription Drugs Part A Part B
Any Exp ln(Exp | Any) Any Exp ln(Exp)
Age 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.27**
(0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05)
Age Squared –0.04 –0.02 0.01 –0.16**
(0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Male –0.58** –0.25** 0.06 –0.31**
(0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.06)
Race: Black –0.33** –0.14** –0.39** –0.23**
(0.11) (0.04) (0.10) (0.07)
Race: Hispanic 0.36 –0.08 –0.39* 0.01
(0.26) (0.09) (0.24) (0.01)
Race: Other Nonwhite –0.12 –0.18** –0.26 0.01
(0.18) (0.06) (0.18) (0.10)
Years of Education 0.01 0.01 –0.01 0.02**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Rural Resident –0.17** 0.02 –0.26** –0.23**
(0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05)
Income 0.04** 0.02 –0.04** 0.05**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Height (in inches) 0.01 0.00 –0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Previously Had Cancer 0.46** 0.06** 0.08 0.43**
(0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04)
Previously Had Diabetes 1.42** 0.38** 0.30** 0.60**
(0.15) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05)
Previously Had Heart Attack 0.86** 0.39** 0.37** 0.35**
(0.11) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05)
Previously Had Hardening Artery 0.54** 0.13** 0.09 0.24**
(0.13) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06)
Previously Had Hypertension 1.72** 0.60** –0.14** 0.35**
(0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04)
Previously Had Other Heart Diseases 0.94** 0.28** 0.23** 0.40**
(0.10) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04)
Previously Had Lung Disease 0.89** 0.42** 0.28** 0.31**
(0.12) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06)
Previously Had Stroke 0.46** 0.17** 0.11 0.06
(0.15) (0.03) (0.08) (0.06)
Factor loading on permanent heterogeneity, ρ 1.94** 0.53** 1.16** 5.65**
(0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates joint signiﬁcance at the 5% level; * 10% level.
52Table A3: Parameter Estimates Explaining Initial Health
5-6 ADLs 3-4 ADLs 1-2 ADLs IADL only
Age –0.70** 0.51** –0.40** –0.28**
(0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Age Squared 0.53** 0.40** 0.31** 0.23**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Male –0.75** –0.84** –0.47** –0.76**
(0.14) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08)
Race: Black 0.68** 0.57** 0.21** 0.27**
(0.15) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09)
Race: Hispanic –0.44 0.02 –0.17 0.13
(0.44) (0.29) (0.20) (0.20)
Race: Other Nonwhite 0.31 –0.39 –0.05 0.23
(0.28) (0.28) (0.16) (0.15)
Years of Education –0.12** –0.08** –0.07** –0.06**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Rural Resident –0.12 0.13 0.14** 0.01
(0.11) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)
Height (in inches) –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Previously Had Cancer 0.13 0.09 0.18** 0.17**
(0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)
Previously Had Diabetes 0.54** 0.67** 0.51** 0.14*
(0.12) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07)
Previously Had Heart Attack –0.06 0.26** 0.22** 0.28**
(0.11) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06)
Previously Had Hardening Artery 0.59** 0.63** 0.33** 0.25**
(0.12) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Previously Had Hypertension –0.40 0.14* 0.11** 0.03
(0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
Previously Had Other Heart Diseases 0.47 0.35** 0.30** 0.26**
(0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)
Previously Had Lung Disease 0.59** 0.87** 0.71** 0.59**
(0.13) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07)
Previously Had Stroke 1.79** 1.17** 0.64** 0.54**
(0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
Factor loading on permanent heterogeneity, ρ –1.85** –0.87** –0.65** –0.10
( 0.32) (0.14) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.09)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates joint signiﬁcance at the 5% level; * 10% level.
The omitted outcome is no I/ADLs.
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